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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, investor-state arbitration has made tremendous 
gains in both credibility and use. There is now widespread accession 
to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention” or 
“Washington Convention”).1 States have executed more than 2,000 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) defining the terms and conditions 
under which one (“investor”) state’s nationals and companies will 
invest in the other (“host”) state.2 Such terms include provisions 
allowing foreign investors to initiate arbitration proceedings against 
the host state, and at this point, more than 500 disputes have been 
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 1. “There are currently 158 signatory States to the ICSID Convention.” Member States, 
INT’L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front 
Servlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=MemberStates_Home (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2013).  
 2. Bilateral Investment Treaties, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
bilateral_investment_treaty (last visited Apr. 5, 2014). The U.N. Conference on Trade & 
Development (UNCTAD) reported 2,495 bilateral investment treaties as of 2005. U.N. CONF. 
ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INV. REPORT 2006, FDI FROM DEV. & TRANSITION ECONS.: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEV., at xix, U.N. Sales No. E.06.IID.11 (July 2006). 
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submitted to investor-state arbitration.
3
 There is, however, one very 
notable example of a rapidly developing state that has rejected this 
system of international dispute resolution in favor of nation-level 
structures. That example is the largely industrialized state of Brazil.  
Brazil boasts the seventh largest economy in the world,
4
 $65 
billion in foreign direct investment,
5
 and enticing investment 
opportunities in advance of its hosting of the 2014 World Cup and 
2016 Olympic Games. But Brazil does not have a single BIT in 
force.
6
 Brazil’s notorious absence from international investment 
arbitration has been described as the product of the region’s recent 
economic history, coupled with technical and political barriers that 
have impeded the ratification of BITs in particular. Some 
commentators have also found that Brazil’s failure to enact BITs and 
its general avoidance of international forums for dispute resolution 
are largely the result of shifting priorities on the part of the executive 
branch of the Brazilian government, as will be discussed in Part 
III, infra.  
Those who are most interested in international investment 
arbitration often present Brazil’s choice not to ratify its BITs as 
problematic and, indeed, as a failure. This label, however, is only 
used by certain audiences in assessing Brazil’s actions.7 Using 
Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice, and loyalty—supplemented by 
procedural justice research and theory—a different conclusion 
emerges. The failure of Brazil’s executive and legislative branches to 
reach agreement on BITs represents a story of Brazilian legislators’ 
exit from the product that had been negotiated by the state’s 
diplomats. But this exit also evidences the executive’s 
 
 3. International Investment Disputes Hit Record in 2012, UN NEWS CTR. (Apr. 10, 
2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44616#.Uwj7Df0wwds.  
 4. Ben Tavener, Brazil Slides to 7th World Economy, RIO TIMES (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/brazil-slides-to-7th-world-economy/.  
 5. ORG. ECON. COOP. & DEV., FDI IN FIGURES (Apr. 2013), available at http://www. 
oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI%20in%20figures.pdf.  
 6. Elizabeth Whitsitt & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: Yes or 
No?, INV. TREATY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2008), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2008/11/30/investment-
arbitration-in-brazil-yes-or-no/; ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT’L CTR. 
FOR THE SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?Request 
Type=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewBilateral&reqFrom=Main. 
 7. For a discussion of the arguments for and against ratification of Brazilian BITs, see 
Whitsitt & Vis-Dunbar, supra note 6.  
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acknowledgement and even-handed, dignified treatment of the voice 
expressed by Brazilian legislators. Ultimately, such voice and 
acknowledgement led to executive and legislative collaboration in the 
creation of new, unbundled legislation that responded to state 
concerns while also providing sufficient protection to foreign 
investors. Such products include: constitutional equal protection for 
foreign investors, protections for the free flow of capital, double 
taxation treaties, investment opportunities through privatization and 
concessions, and arbitration law reforms.  
For Brazil’s domestic constituents and its foreign investors, these 
alternative approaches to investment protection actually represent 
superior products that were more responsive than BITs to the needs 
and interests of the state at that time. Far from representing failure, 
then, the development of these products represents a success for 
Brazil’s domestic and foreign stakeholders. Perhaps as evidence of 
this, foreign investment in Brazil continues to be strong.
8
  
Meanwhile, Brazil’s role in foreign investment has evolved as its 
own multinational corporations increasingly engage in foreign 
investment. Inevitably, these corporations seek to reduce the risk of 
their foreign investments. As a result, they may encourage Brazil’s 
executive and legislative branches to take a second look at BITs. As 
circumstances change, so may the definition of success.  
This Article begins, in Part II, by describing the economic and 
political context within which Brazil began its consideration of BITs. 
Part III recounts Brazil’s history with BITs in some detail. Part IV 
examines alternative investment protection legislation adopted in 
Brazil. Part V then turns to Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice, and 
loyalty, as well as the theories and research of procedural justice, to 
 
 8. While the Brazilian economy has certainly taken a downturn since its historic rise 
after the global financial crisis, see Has Brazil Blown It?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2013, available 
at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21586833-stagnant-economy-bloated-state-and-
mass-protests-mean-dilma-rousseff-must-change-course-has, the country accounted for “47 
percent of South America’s total [FDI] in 2013” and “remained significant at $63 billion.” 
Global Foreign Direct Investment Rises to Pre-Crisis Levels, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/story.asp?NewsID=47029&Cr=trade&Cr1=#.U0HPHK
1dXgI; see also Gustavo Fernandes de Andrade & Gustavo Henrique Justino de Oliveira, 
Investment Treaties, Foreign Investment and Brazilian Law: The Magic of Reality, in 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 88–89 (Daniel de Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau de Borja & 
Adriana Noemi Pucci eds.).  
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apply them to Brazil’s history with BITs and to consider the 
particular relationship between procedural justice and loyalty. 
Ultimately, the Article urges that Hirschman’s theory and the theories 
and research regarding procedural justice encourage a 
reconceptualization of Brazil’s alleged “failure” in choosing not to 
ratify the BITs that had been negotiated by its diplomats.  
II. BRAZIL’S EVOLVING ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND INTEREST 
IN THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The Brazilian experience with BITs must be understood within the 
larger context of the country’s evolution in terms of economics and 
politics. Brazil’s approach to economic liberalization, meanwhile, fits 
within the even larger context of economic trends occurring 
worldwide and in the Latin American region.
9
 In particular, reaction 
to the Mexican debt crisis of 1982
10
 and Bolivian hyperinflation in 
1985
11
 led to a trend of economic liberalization in Latin America.
12
 
Often, with guidance from international organizations such as the 
World Bank, and with input from developed nations’ experts,13 Latin 
American nations opened their economies to foreign competition. 
Their goals were to achieve growth in their gross domestic product 
and to gain the spillover effects of development.
14
 The countries in 
this region understood BITs would signal their interest in direct 
 
 9. See Leslie Bethell, Brazil and ‘Latin America,’ 42 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 457 (2010). 
 10. See Richard H.K. Vietor & Eilene Zimmerman, Mexico in Debt, Case No. 9-797-110, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 12, 2001, at 3. 
 11. See Rafael Di Tella & Huw Pill, Bolivia: Globalization, Sovereignty, or Democracy?, 
Case No. 9-702-086, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 12, 2003, at 5–7.  
 12. Daniel de Andrade Levy & Rodrigo Moreira, ICSID in Latin America: Where Does 
Brazil Stand?, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 17, 20 (Daniel de Andrade Levy, Ana 
Gerdau de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci eds., 2013) (“In the process of liberalization of the 
Latin-American economies, known as the Apertura, where most public services were privatized 
and access to natural resources—especially oil and gas—was conceded to international 
companies, several BITs were signed in order to attract FDI [foreign direct investment], which 
consequently led to the fall of the Calvo Doctrine in the region.”). 
 13. See, e.g., the work of Jeffrey Sachs in Bolivia during the country’s 1985 efforts 
toward stabilizing hyperinflation. Jeffrey Sachs, The Bolivian Hyperinflation and Stabilization, 
77 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 279 (1987), available at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/ 
sitefiles/file/about/director/documents/AER0587_000.pdf.  
 14. See ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND POVERTY: LATIN AMERICA IN 
THE 1990S (Rob Vos, Lance Taylor & Ricardo Paes de Barros eds., 2002).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/10
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foreign investment, and would promote such investment by providing 
certain substantive assurances to investors and a neutral method of 
resolving any dispute that might arise.
15
 Brazil’s execution of a wave 
of BITs in the mid-1990s, therefore, was entirely consistent with a 
worldwide
16
 and Latin American phenomenon.
17
  
During this period, Brazil transitioned from a military government 
with a largely closed economy, guided by import substitution 
industrialization principles,
18
 to a civilian-led, constitutional 
democracy.
19
 Fernando Collor de Mello, the first popularly elected 
Brazilian president after the conclusion of the military regime, 
established largely neoliberal economic policies during the early 
1990s. His successor, Itamar Franco,
20
 continued such policies. These 
policies were aimed at attracting and protecting investment,
21
 and 
 
 15. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1523 
(2005).  
 16. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilaterial Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (1998) (“As of July 1996, 
there were 1010 BITs in existence around the globe, more than half of which have been signed 
or brought into force since the start of 1990.”). 
 17. See Levy & Moreira, supra note 12, at 20.  
 18. PEDRO DA MOTTA VEIGA, INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, BRAZIL’S STRATEGY FOR 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 2 (June 
1996), available at http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Brazil's%20Strategy%20for% 
20Trade%20Liberalization%20and%20Economic%20Integration%20in%20the%20Western%2
0Hemishpere.pdf. Import substitution industrialization is an economic policy adopted by many 
developing countries, especially in Latin America, with the aim of supplementing economies 
previously based solely on the export of agricultural products by substituting previously 
imported manufactured goods with locally produced goods, thus increasing domestic 
manufacturing opportunities and thus overall industrialization and development. The 
consequence of this policy, it is argued, is a generally closed economy that utilizes trade 
barriers to promote and protect local industry. See JEFFRY FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS 
FALL AND RISE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 220–29 (2006); see also Werner Baer & Isaac 
Kerstenetzky, Import Substitution and Industrialization in Brazil, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 411, 413–
14 (1964). 
 19. See David V. Fleischer, Government and Politics, in BRAZIL: A COUNTRY STUDY 256 
(Rex A. Hudson ed., 5th ed. 1998), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/brtoc.html. 
 20. Franco became President after Collor de Mello resigned after being impeached by the 
Brazilian Congress. Jeb Blount & William R. Long, Brazil President Resigns in Wake of 
Impeachment, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1992, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1992-12-
30/news/mn-2585_1_vice-president. 
 21. See Fleischer, supra note 19; Ross Schneider, Brazil Under Collor: Anatomy of a 
Crisis, 8 WORLD POL’Y J. 321, 326 (1991); Francisco Panizza, Neopopulism and Its Limits in 
Collor’s Brazil, 19 BULL. OF LATIN AM. RES. 177, 184–86 (2000) (describing Collor’s “high 
risk strategy” of combining an anti-inflationary package, exchange rate liberalization, opening 
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they included the country’s accession to the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency Convention (MIGA),
22
 execution of double-
taxation treaties,
23
 trade and financial liberalization, and the 
privatization of state-owned entities.
24
 BIT negotiations also began 
during this time.
25
 Privatization was perhaps the most influential 
factor in prompting the government to encourage investment 
protection measures. The provision of risk reduction to foreign 
investors would result in direct benefits to the government, which 
 
to external competition, decreased import tariffs, and the National Privatisation Programme. 
Panizza details the implementation of this strategy as one of “imposition rather than 
negotiation,” noting that “the plan was drafted in secret by a closed group of economic advisers, 
mostly academics and businessmen, with no links to the techno-bureaucracy which had 
traditionally dominated economic policy making in Brazil.”). 
 22. MIGA, a branch of the World Bank Group, provides political risk insurance 
guarantees to private sector investors, with the aim of promoting foreign direct investment. By 
joining MIGA as a member country, investments (as defined by the MIGA convention) in the 
country become eligible for a MIGA insurance guarantee, subject to approval by the host 
country. MIGA, as an organization, also conducts research and works with developing countries 
to improve the environment for FDI. See generally Convention Establishing the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99, available at 
http://www.miga.org/documents/miga_convention_november_2010.pdf. Brazil became a 
MIGA member on January 7, 1993. Miga Members, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20122866~menuPK:329836~pagePK:
34542~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html (last updated Nov. 11, 2013). 
 23. Double taxation treaties are bilateral agreements with the aim of preventing the 
taxation of the same taxpayer with regards to the same subject matter for identical periods. This 
occurs when countries adopt different theories of taxation that can overlap, e.g., one country 
imposing taxes based on residency and another based on the source of income. Fabian Barthel, 
Matthias Busse & Eric Neumayer, The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment: Evidence from Large Dyadic Panel Data, 28 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y. 366, 367 
(2010). Brazil has approximately twenty-eight DTTs in place, nine of which were negotiated 
and signed between 1988 and 2002 (India in 1988, Korea in 1989, Netherlands in 1990, China 
in 1991, Finland in 1996, Portugal in 2000, Chile in 2001, and Israel and Ukraine in 2002). 
Three have been signed since 2002, and it has been reported that Brazil is actively negotiating 
with other countries. Double Taxation Conventions, RECEITA FED., http://www.receita 
.fazenda.gov.br/principal/ingles/Acordo/DuplaTributDefault.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2014); 
see also Juliana Mello, Brazil and International Tax Treaties, BRAZIL BUS., 
http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/brazil-and-international-tax-treaties (May 4, 2012). 
 24. See Panizza, supra note 21; CELIO HIRATUKA, WORKING GRP. ON DEV. & ENV’T IN 
THE AMS., FOREIGN DIRECT INV. & TRANSNAT’L CORPS. IN BRAZIL: RECENT TRENDS & 
IMPACTS ON ECON. DEV. 1 (Apr. 2008), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP10 
HiratukaApr08.pdf. 
 25. Leany Lemos & Daniela Campello, The Non-Ratification of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties in Brazil: A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation 7–8 (Princeton University 
Department of Politics, April 1, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243120. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/10
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sought to profit generously from the sale of state-owned entities.
26
 
With these various policy initiatives, Brazil made a concerted effort 
to signal that the country was a safe and worthwhile investment.  
Fernando Henrique Cardoso assumed the presidency in 1995 and 
expanded upon Collor de Mello’s initial principles. The Cardoso 
administration’s “Real Plan” included a series of monetary and 
financial reforms, which involved a new phase of privatizations and 
coincided with reductions in various trade barriers.
27
 During this 
time, Brazil began negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investments (MAI), and promulgated both concessions and 
arbitration laws. This trend in policy both maximized governmental 
interests and represented a reaction to a chorus of international 
corporate and organizational calls for liberalization of foreign direct 
investment.
28
 At the time, Brazilian media encouraged policies to 
attract investors and often highlighted rival Argentina’s strategies in 
privatization and market-based reforms.
29
 Multinational corporations 
that had already initiated investments in Brazil also expressed interest 
in investment protection.
30
 Importantly, however, the corporations 
focused on issues such as cross-border capital transfers and national 
treatment, rather than BITs in particular. This will be discussed in 
Part IV, infra.
31
 
In the midst of these economic and political developments, Brazil 
continued to execute BITs. Further, as will be described in more 
detail infra, the Brazilian Congress began to consider them for 
ratification. The Brazilian executive branch also created an 
 
 26. Id. at 8. The Brazilian Congress also took steps in other areas of reform to increase the 
attractiveness of its privatization program. For example, the 1997 reform to the Corporations 
Law limited various minority shareholder rights, such as tag-along tender offers and reductions 
in withdrawal rights, with the goal of making state-owned entities with minority shareholders 
more attractive to large-scale buyers wishing to acquire controlling blocks. See Bruno M. 
Salama & Viviane Muller Prado, Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders of Listed 
Corporations in Brazil: Brief History, Legal Structure and Empirical Evidence 4–5 (Fundação 
Getulio Vargas Law School at São Paulo, May 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1856634. 
 27. VEIGA, supra note 18, at 3.  
 28. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 7–8; Whitsitt & Vis-Dunbar, supra note 6.  
 29. Id. at 8.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 7–8. These concepts were included in BITs, but were also addressed through 
other legal forms, such as ordinary legislation, as will be discussed in Part IV, infra.  
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Interministerial Working Group to develop a model BIT. Brazil’s 
negotiations over BITs, however, must be understood as largely 
reactive.
32
 In most cases, the home states of international investors 
initiated the negotiation process for Brazilian BITs as they sought to 
assist their corporations with managing costs and risk.
33
 It has been 
reported, for example, that countries like Germany sought to execute 
BITs with Brazil based on the argument that without such 
agreements, credit would be expensive for their citizen-investors.
34
 
More systemically, Brazil’s earlier accession to the MIGA pushed the 
state toward BITs.
35
 If there is a BIT in place between an investor 
country and the host country, MIGA considers there to be an 
adequate level of legal protection.
36
 Without a BIT, on the other 
hand, an applicant-foreign investor bears the burden of demonstrating 
the host country has sufficient alternate legal protections regarding 
fair and equitable treatment.
37
  
Many countries had formally proposed BITs to the Brazilian 
government as of 1990, and there were eleven negotiations under 
way in 1993.
38
 This process produced fourteen signed BITs—with 
Portugal, Chile, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Switzerland in 
1994; Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Venezuela in 
1995; Cuba in 1997; the Netherlands in 1998; and Belgium in 1999.
39
 
(Much earlier, in 1966, Brazil had executed—and ratified—a BIT 
with the United States. However, “it created an enormous 
controversy, and never came to be applied.”40). The other fourteen 
 
 32. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9. 
 33. Id.; see also ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT’L CTR. FOR THE 
SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS., https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet. 
 34. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 7.  
 35. Id. 
 36. KARL SAUVANT, YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 559–
60 (2009–2010). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9.  
 39. Paulo Macedo Garcia Neto, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: The Landscape of 
Investment Arbitration in Brazil and Why Brazil Should become a More Important Player in the 
Investment Arbitration Arena, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 3, 6 n.15 (Daniel de 
Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci eds.). 
 40. Id. at 7. It is useful to recall that the U.S.-Brazil BIT likely was ratified during the 
period when Brazil’s military dictatorship was in power. TERESA A. MEADE, A BRIEF HISTORY 
OF BRAZIL 164 (2010).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/10
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signed BITs never even reached ratification, as described infra, and 
ultimately were removed from consideration at the end of 2002.
41
 
Having consistently been rated as a “safe harbour for 
investments”42 and an “investment grade country”43 that receives the 
fifth largest amount of foreign direct investment (FDI)
44
 globally,
45
 
Brazil’s Foreign Affairs Ministry (“Itamaraty”) has recently re-
initiated investment-related negotiations in certain strategic 
situations.
46
 There are reports of both negotiations and attempted 
negotiations with Chile, Canada, India, and the European Union 
(EU), and Brazil has signed approximately eleven memorandums of 
understanding—mostly with fellow members of the Global South.47  
 
 41. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 7–8. 
 42. Neto, supra note 39, at 4.  
 43. Credit Trends: Emerging Markets Credit Metrics: Brazil Shows Positive Rating 
Trends, STANDARD & POOR’S (Aug. 24, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://www.standardandpoors.com/ 
ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245339022519. 
 44. The OECD provides the following definition of foreign direct investment: “FDI is 
defined as cross-border investment by a resident entity in one economy with the objective of 
obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy. The lasting interest 
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise 
and a significant degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the enterprise. 
Ownership of at least 10% of the voting power, representing the influence by the investor, is the 
basic criterion used.” OECD Factbook 2013: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, 
OECD ILIBRARY (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2013-en/04/02/ 
01/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2013-34-en. However, the definition of 
“investment” in general is subject to significant debate, especially in the context of investment 
treaty arbitration. See generally Tony Cole & Anuj Kumar Vaksha, Power-Conferring Treaties: 
The Meaning of ‘Investment’ in the ICSID Convention, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 305 (2011).  
 45. Daniel Tavela Luis & Luis Antonio Gonçalves de Andrade, Expropriation in 
Brazilian Law: An International Standard?, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 107, 107 
(Daniel de Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci eds.). 
 46. Neto, supra note 39, at 7. 
 47. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 8. The Global South is used here as the 
evolving synonym for the Third World. While the definitions of First and Second worlds have 
been subject to different perspectives, the term “Third World” or “Global South” has been used 
to refer to “Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans, that is the people of the countries located 
roughly in three southern continents and sharing a history of underdevelopment and 
colonialism.” JACQUILINE ANNE BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, INSTITUTIONS OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
1–2 (2009).  
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III. THE NEGOTIATION, SIGNING, AND RATIFICATION PROCESS 
The Brazilian executive branch, the central and most powerful 
source of international policy for the country, possesses the 
prerogative to enter into treaty negotiations.
48
 Within the executive 
branch, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, known as the Itamaraty, leads 
the delegations for negotiating international treaties.
49
 Any 
documents signed by the Itamaraty delegation are sent to the Casa 
Civil, or the ministerial equivalent of the presidential chief of staff.
50
 
The president is then required to send the treaty to the Brazilian 
Congress, along with an explanation, or Exposicão de Motivos, to 
begin the ratification process.
51
  
Brazil is recognized as having one of the most influential and 
powerful executives in terms of its procedural and persuasive 
influence over the legislature.
52
 Indeed, approximately 85 percent of 
the legislation adopted in Brazil originates in the executive branch 
and encounters little resistance from the legislature.
53
 The Brazilian 
Congress is not without power, however. Treaties are not effective 
unless ratified by the Congress.
54
 Increasingly, the Brazilian 
Congress has made such ratifications subject to conditions or 
reservations.
55
 The ratification process for BITs, however, does not 
permit automatic legislative modification.
56
 Rather, the legislature 
only has the power to ratify without reservations, ratify with 
reservations, or refuse to ratify a BIT.
57
 While Congress may not 
amend the text of the treaty, it can make reservations indicating its 
disagreement with the text.
58
 At the time of the BIT ratification 
debates, there was some uncertainty as to whether such reservations 
 
 48. Id. at 11.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTIAL ASSEMBLIES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS (1992). 
 53. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 9–11. 
 58. Id. at 14.  
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would have the effect of amendments, and thus require renegotiation 
at the international level.
59
 The consequences of such uncertainty are 
discussed in this part, infra. Importantly, the treaty ratification 
process does not incorporate a presidential veto, increasing the power 
of Congress in this particular area of international relations.
60
 
The Brazilian Congress has two chambers, both of which are 
involved in the treaty ratification process. The president first sends a 
treaty to the Chamber of Deputies (CD). This chamber then has a 
two-step committee approval system, beginning with the gatekeeping 
committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense, which approves 
or disapproves the treaty and sends it to a floor vote. After this initial 
committee consideration and floor vote, the treaties are submitted as 
legislative decree bills to a set of two or three subject-specific 
committees. In this case, the treaties were submitted to the Finance 
and Taxes Committee; the Economic Development, Industry, and 
Commerce Committee; and the Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship 
Committee. If approved, the treaties are subject to another floor vote, 
where they must receive a simple majority. Throughout this process 
in the CD, debate and consideration is guided by a rapporteur chosen 
by the chairmen of the committees, usually on the basis of party 
position.
61
 If the CD rejects the treaty, the process concludes. If the 
CD votes in favor of the treaty, it sends it to the Senate, where it is 
considered by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee 
and is then subject to a floor vote. During this entire process, 
individual delegates and senators can propose reservations (or 
amendments) to the bills, which also trigger reconsideration by the 
relevant committees.  
The first four BITs signed by Brazil were introduced into this 
process together.
62
 Despite the governing coalition’s control over the 
relevant committees, they took two years to be tabled and voted upon 
at the gatekeeping committee level.
63
 Even with this delay, inevitable 
approval was considered likely, as many of the key rapporteurs 
 
 59. Id. at n.13. 
 60. Id. at 11. 
 61. Id. at 15. 
 62. Id. at 17–18. 
 63. Id. at 18. 
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championed the treaties as a way to increase the country’s 
competitiveness and to signal Brazil’s departure from typical third 
world practices.
64
  
However, after this point, the treaties received atypical and 
perplexing treatment, marking an unusual departure from traditional 
executive-legislative relations.
65
 The ratification process was slowed 
significantly, based partially on shifting coalitions and control of 
power, and partially on competing legislation.
66
 These two realities 
exposed decreased advocacy and determination by the very party that 
introduced the treaties—the executive.67  
On the floor and in subsequent committee considerations, the 
treaties faced opposition from members of the Worker’s Party (PT)—
a party which, at the time, had only 10 percent of Congressional 
seats—as well as some members of the governing coalition.68 The 
treaties’ scope of investment, provision of international arbitration, 
most-favored nation clauses, and constitutional conflicts served as the 
major sticking points.
69
  
With regard to the scope of investment, the opposition believed 
the original text allowed for speculative capital—the source of many 
emerging market economic crises
70—to fall within the definition of 
investment.
71
 This, along with developing doubts regarding the 
correlation between accession to BITs and increases in foreign 
investment,
72
 constituted the main economic concern raised by the 
opposition. Because the government could not (or would not) 
distinguish between the investments that could come within the scope 
of the BIT, Brazil could neither prompt productive growth nor protect 
 
 64. Id. (describing Third World nations as tending to institute closed economies and 
practice protectionism, often leading to dysfunctional economies when paired with political 
risk). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 18–19. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See generally Dilip K. Das, Private Capital Flows and Speculative Runs in Emerging 
Market Economies, 4 J. ASIA PAC. ECON. 413 (1999).  
 71. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 18–19. 
 72. For a criticism of the correlation between bilateral investment treaties and foreign 
direct investment, see Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign 
Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011). 
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itself against the more dangerous forms of investment.
73
 Thus, more 
liquid and short-term capital flows, such as portfolio investments, 
could be given the same protections from government restriction as 
more permanent (and thus desirable) forms, such as physical 
investments.
74
 
International investment arbitration, especially under the auspices 
of the World Bank’s ICSID, concerned the opposition for a variety of 
reasons. First, it contradicted the Calvo Doctrine that guided Latin 
American policies toward foreign investment for over a hundred 
years.
75
 Specifically, the creation of an international forum ran 
against the Doctrine’s rejection of perceived imperial imposition of 
the preferences of more powerful states, as well as its advocacy for 
exclusive local jurisdiction for disputes between the state and foreign 
investors.
76
 Nonetheless, Brazilian courts have held that commercial 
and investment arbitration is constitutional.
77
 This concern about 
 
 73. Dan Wei, Bilateral Investment Treaties: An Empirical Analysis of the Practices of 
Brazil and China, EUR. J.L. & ECON. 663, 672 (2012). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Wenhua Shan, From North-South Divide to Private-Public Debate: Revival of the 
Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law, 27 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 631, 632 (2007). 
 76. Id.; see also Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 19. Some states preferred that 
investors be subject to the laws and standards of the nation in which they invest, rather than 
being afforded the protection of an international standard of treatment that would come with a 
transnational tribunal—particularly in Latin American states that had adopted the Calvo 
Doctrine. See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 25, 26–7 (2009); Bernardo M. Cremades, Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine 
in Latin America, 7 BUS. L. INT’L 53, 55–56 (2006); James Thuo Gathii, War’s Legacy in 
International Investment Law, 11 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 353, 355, 362–63 (2009); Mary Helen 
Mourra, The Conflicts and Controversies in Latin American Treaty-Based Disputes, in LATIN 
AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 8 
(Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 2008); Alejandro A. Escobar, Introductory Note on Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Recently Concluded by Latin American States, 11 ICSID REV. 86–87 
(1996) (“The conclusion of BITs by Latin American states is in itself noteworthy, due to the 
traditional position these states have had in regard to the international legal protection of 
foreign investment. . . . Their officials and scholars have advanced the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the host state’s courts over investment disputes and the settlement of these disputes primarily on 
the basis of that state’s domestic law.”). 
 77. Julio C. Barbosa, Arbitration Law in Brazil: An Inevitable Reality, 9 SW. J.L. & 
TRADE AM. 131, 131–32 (2002); Daniel M.C. Barbosa & Pedro Martini, Two Sides of the Same 
Coin: To What Extent is Arbitration with the Brazilian Administration Similar to Investment-
Treaty Arbitration?, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 37, 41 (Daniel de Andrade Levy et 
al. eds., 2013) (“The understanding that the Brazilian state may submit disputes to arbitration 
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arbitration was about much more than the mere procedural removal 
of investor-state disputes from national courts, however. International 
arbitration raised serious questions about imperialism, sovereignty, 
and international arbitrators’ ability or willingness to respect Brazil’s 
social and developmental concerns.
78
 These substantive principles 
had been given a prominent place in the country’s 1988 
Constitution,
79
 but it was unclear whether international arbitrators 
would perceive themselves as bound by Brazilian law or public 
policy.
80
 The opposition’s concerns were perhaps verified by 
Argentina’s experience with ICSID in the wake of its financial crisis 
in the early 2000s.
81
  
Second, and more generally, the relationships among the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
82
 
the World Bank, ICSID, and BITs raised fears of arbitral support for 
 
has been confirmed by Brazilian courts . . . .”). See also discussion infra, pages 127–28 
regarding the Brazilian Supreme Court’s 2001 ruling on arbitration. 
 78. See, e.g., Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 20 (detailing the rapporteur’s concern 
that bilateral investment treaties would restrict the government from regulating certain 
economic matters, specifically capital).  
 79. Keith S. Rosenn, Conflict Resolution and Constitutionalism: The Making of the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1988, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE 
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 452 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010) (describing the Brazilian 
Constitution as “dirigiste and programmatic, setting out ambitious goals for reforming Brazilian 
society and attempting to determine the political course of action for future governments”). 
 80. While the arbitral seat is able to impose its standards for vacatur under the New York 
Convention, it is important to recall that Brazil had not ratified the Convention until 2002. 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 
(June 10, 1958). 
 81. See Eric David Kasenetz, Note, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: The 
Aftermath of Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current Fight in the ICSID, 41 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 709 (2010) (describing the negative legal treatment of the emergency measures 
put into place during the Argentinian financial crisis).  
 82. The OECD is an intergovernmental organization with thirty-four member states that 
share economic expertise with the aim of fostering economic development in emerging 
economies. The member states of the OECD are known to be the most economically advanced 
in the world, but membership is “limited only by a country’s commitment to a market economy 
and a pluralistic democracy.” JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21128: ORG. 
FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21128.pdf. 
The thirty-four member states include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United 
States. Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/ 
membersand partners/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). 
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remedies consistent with the sorts of painful neoliberal economic 
reforms and standards imposed by the World Bank in response to the 
series of economic crises in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s.
83
 
Brazil had postured itself as an alternative source of development 
policy,
84
 rather than adopting and embracing the economic 
suggestions put forth by the World Bank and other organizations like 
the OECD. This concern regarding the potential remedies imposed by 
arbitrators was particularly evident among the opposition parties 
standing to the left of the governing coalition.
85
  
Lastly, the BITs were seen as reciprocal only in the most formal 
sense, because they did not impose equal restrictions on the investor 
or capital-exporting states.
86
 Rather, in practice, the risk and burdens 
were placed on the state hosting investment, while the investor’s 
home state only served to benefit through expanded protections for its 
constituents.
87
  
Regarding the “most favored nation” clauses in many BITs, which 
often allow investors to adopt more favorable measures than the 
treaty under which they would have standing,
88
 the opposition 
objected on the basis of sovereignty. Opponents urged that Brazil 
should be able to form specialized agreements with particular 
countries
89
 and offer preferred terms to those foreign investors.  
Finally, there were objections that the BIT provisions requiring 
“prompt, prior and effective” compensation in the case of 
expropriation were in conflict with the preexisting constitutional 
structure for such takings.
90
 The Brazilian Constitution has provisions 
regulating expropriation for various reasons and for the intended use 
of the land, and sets forth different methods of calculating damages 
for each.
91
 This, along with a payment system of cash releases that 
 
 83. Neto, supra note 39, at 13. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. As Brazilian companies have themselves become foreign investors, the risks and 
burdens of BITs will be more equally allocated between Brazil and other signatory states.  
 88. Stephen W. Schill, Multilateralizing Investment Treaties through Most Favored 
Nation Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 496, 502 (2009). 
 89. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 19. 
 90. Tavela Luis & Gonçalves de Andrade, supra note 45, at 118–23. 
 91. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 45:105 
 
 
requires including the payment in the following year’s budget,92 is 
much more detailed than expropriation and compensation, as broadly 
defined and envisioned by the BITs, thus creating conflicting 
standards.
93
 BIT protection of the free transfer of capital also faced 
constitutional opposition, as Article 172 provides for Brazilian 
regulation of foreign capital investments and the remittance of 
profits.
94
 Law No. 4390 specifically grants the Superinterdency 
Council of the Currency and Credit the authority to impose 
restrictions upon imports and remittance of foreign capital, in the 
case of serious instability in the balance of payments.
95
  
As noted supra, the first four treaties to be sent to Congress 
cleared the gatekeeper committee stage only after two years, far 
exceeding the amount of time generally required for the majority of 
international treaties and agreements.
96
 Despite the substantive 
objections described supra, the delay was attributed to the procedural 
demands of competing bills.
97
 The three subject-specific committees 
had generally favorable opinions of the treaties but required two more 
years, as some opposition arose regarding specific provisions.
98
 
Ultimately, competing versions of the bills reached the floor of the 
House—one with an interpretative clause on expropriations and the 
other eliminating the international arbitration provisions.
99
  
At this point, there were significant delays in voting, due to fears 
regarding the cost of doing so.
100
 If the treaties had been approved 
with the proposed modifications (or reservations), Brazil may have 
 
 92. Id. at 123 (observing that this requirement is not always met, and federal, state, and 
municipal entities may take up to twenty years to deposit the funds in the investor’s bank 
account); Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 56 (observing that governmental debts resulting 
from arbitral awards are to be included in the next year’s budget “which will be paid in the 
chronological order of their presentation,” which means “private parties holding an arbitral 
award against a state entity in Brazil will literally have to get in line”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Wei, supra note 73, at 673. Balance of payments refers to the difference between 
income from exports and the cost of imports. PETER J. MONTIEL, MACROECONOMICS IN 
EMERGING MARKETS 29 (2d ed. 2011). 
 96. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 18.  
 97. Voting on the BITs was rescheduled twelve or more times. Id. at 19. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
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been required to reinitiate negotiations with Switzerland.
101
 As more 
of the fourteen treaties were introduced, the PT continued to 
introduce amendments (or reservations) regarding free transfers, 
government approval for international arbitration, and the ability of 
Congress to regulate investments.
102
 This sent bills back to 
committees, where the PT had gained control over key seats. In 
addition, coalition members were beginning to shift in their opinions 
regarding BITs.
103
 As a result, by 2000, the various treaties were 
stuck in either the first or second steps of committee review, with 
varying levels of modification from the original text.
104
 This, again, 
increased the cost of a final vote, as renegotiation was necessary with 
additional countries that had already ratified the BITs.
105
 In 
December 2002, this reality led President Cardoso to withdraw all 
BITs from the Brazilian Congress, just two weeks before he was to 
hand over the presidency to Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva of the PT.106 
Despite acknowledging Congressional obstacles to ratification, 
Brazilian scholars Lemos and Campello also report, based on a series 
of interviews, that the executive showed a striking lack of willingness 
to exercise its significant persuasive powers to guarantee ratification 
of the BITs.
107
 As mentioned supra, executive-legislative relations in 
Brazil are characterized by an assertive and central presidency.
108
 
Due to the fractured coalition system within Congress, deal making 
and negotiation often are organized by the executive, which has the 
resources and power to distribute, share, threaten to withdraw, or 
actually withdraw both the perks of cabinet-level and party 
appointments and “pork” for individual legislators and their 
constituencies.
109
 This sort of leverage makes it entirely 
understandable why the executive is the source of approximately 85 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 22. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 24. 
 108. Id. at 9. 
 109. Id. at 10. See generally Lee J. Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Pork for Policy: Executive 
and Legislative Exchange in Brazil, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 87 (2005).  
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percent of the legislation adopted by Congress,
110
 and the creator of 
urgency in the legislative process.
111
 The executive has utilized these 
tools of persuasion in a very effective manner, as provisional 
measures or decrees issued from this branch have rejection rates as 
low as 8 percent.
112
 Thus, the resistance faced by the BITs, and the 
overwhelming failure in their ratification process, was highly 
unusual. However, Lemos and Campello point out that the BIT 
ratification process is not an instance of failed executive 
persuasion.
113
 Instead, it is more accurate to say that the executive 
tools of persuasion were never truly utilized to force ratification of 
the BITs, and the executive and legislative branches collaborated in 
the development of other investment protections and reforms over the 
same period of time.
114
 This has been attributed to disparate levels of 
commitment on behalf of the various elements within the executive, 
with the Finance Ministry, Central Bank, and Casa Civil considering 
the treaties to be much less of a priority than the diplomats in the 
Itamaraty, who themselves negotiated the treaties.
115
 
Within the executive, the Itamaraty supported ratification of the 
BITs.
116
 But the other important departments within the executive—
e.g., the Finance Ministry, Casa Civil, and the Central Bank—did not 
demonstrate commitment to or support for these treaties.
117
 
Presumably, there was no assertive domestic constituency 
encouraging ratification, and this is significant. If the failed 
ratification process is attributed to the objections and procedural 
wrangling of the PT, this is a story typical of the workings of the 
Calvo Doctrine, and fits with the conduct of other Latin American 
countries that have broken ties with ICSID. However, this 
perspective fails to account for the many economic and legal policies 
put into place during the same time period that do not coincide with 
 
 110. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9.  
 111. Simone Diniz & Claudio Oliveira Ribeiro, The Role of the Brazilian Congress in 
Foreign Policy: An Empirical Contribution to the Debate, 2 BRAZILIAN POL. SCI. REV. 10, 23 
(2008).  
 112. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 9. 
 113. Id. at 24. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 24–25. 
 116. Id. at 28.  
 117. Id. 
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and, in fact, contradict the Calvo Doctrine and the socialist political 
leanings of the main opponents of international investment 
arbitration.
118
 
Thus, although the Calvo Doctrine principles evoked to challenge 
the BITs during the ratification process may certainly have been main 
points of debate for the objecting parties, the real reason Brazil chose 
not to ratify the BITs may be because the key stakeholders’ most 
important interests were satisfied better by the other investment 
protections developed during this period. The following part assesses 
with more depth the various other reforms promulgated in Brazil at 
the time BITs were under consideration, and evaluates the extent to 
which these alternative forms of protection responded to investor and 
business concerns that have traditionally been addressed through 
BITs. 
 
IV. INVESTOR PRIORITIES AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES  
OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 
 
During the same eight-year period in which the Brazilian 
Congress considered and eventually failed to ratify the BITs, it 
collaborated with the executive to make great strides in several other 
areas of investment reform and protection.
119
 Through this 
combination of legal structures, the executive and legislative 
branches met the most important needs of foreign investors while 
protecting the most important interests of the state, thus substantially 
eroding the perceived need for a BIT. Indeed, patterns of foreign 
investment in Brazil, as compared to BIT-adopting countries, 
contradict the common assumption of a necessary correlation 
between BITs and FDI.
120
 Major elements of investment protection 
identified as international standards—e.g., equal treatment for foreign 
businesses, free flow of capital, access to neutral dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and investment incentives—were addressed by the 
 
 118. Fernandes de Andrade & Justino de Oliveira, supra note 8, at 91. 
 119. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 28. 
 120. Fernandes de Andrade & Justino de Oliveira, supra note 118, at 87 (providing an 
empirical comparison of FDI between Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina from 1993 to 2012, as 
against the number of BITs in force). 
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Brazilian government during the 1990s and early 2000s.
121
 To a much 
more limited degree, the government also addressed the desire for 
arbitration.
122
  
 
A. The Brazilian Constitution: Equal Treatment  
and Capital Flow Restrictions 
 
As referenced supra, the nature of the Brazilian Constitution has 
elevated certain rights and issues to a constitutional, rather than 
legislative, level.
123
 Many of the investment protections set forth by 
the Brazilian government were implanted directly into the 
Constitution, or had constitutional roots, elevating their protection 
within the legal system.
124
 One such protection is found in Article 5 
of the Constitution, which provides: 
All persons are equal before the law, without any distinction 
whatsoever, Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country 
being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, to 
equality, to security and to property, on the following terms: 
. . . .
125
 
With this provision, foreign investors are assured both equal 
treatment and property rights within Brazil.
126
 This is further 
elaborated on in Brazil’s extensive provisions on expropriation, 
which, although different from the international standard in form, 
have been acknowledged as largely similar in substance.
127
 
With regard to free capital flows and remittance of profits, Article 
192 of the Brazilian Constitution grants Congress the power to 
regulate the national financial system, as well as to establish 
conditions for foreign investments in domestic financial 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Tavela Luis & Gonçalves de Andrade, supra note 45, at 118.  
 124. Id.  
 125. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.). 
 126. Tavela Luis & Gonçalves de Andrade, supra note 45, at 108. 
 127. Id. at 125. 
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institutions.
128
 Article 172 of the Constitution also provides for the 
regulation of foreign capital investments and remittance of profits.
129
 
Under the power granted in these provisions, Congress passed the 
Foreign Capital Law
130
 and other pieces of legislation, which have 
been described as being “nationality blind” with regard to foreign 
investment.
131
 However, there still remains a regulatory exception in 
the case of balance of payment crises.
132
  
Foreign capital entering the country is subject to electronic 
registration for monitoring purposes yet does not need to meet any set 
of approvals or minimum investment authorizations.
133
 Additionally, 
foreign capital investments are not subject to a minimum time period 
within the country or any substantive approvals or authorizations 
upon remittance of profits out of the country.
134
 Under these 
conditions, Brazil is thought to provide a generally free flow of 
capital in and out of the country. 
 
B. Investment Incentives: The Privatization Program  
and Double Taxation Treaties 
 
The Privatization Program began in Brazil in 1990, and focused 
on the sale of productive state-owned companies in the fields of steel 
manufacturing, petrochemicals, and fertilizers.
135
 In the first four 
years of the program, the country sold its controlling or minority 
shareholdings in thirty-three companies, earning the government $8.6 
billion and transferring $3.3 billion in debt to the private sector.
136
 
Foreign buyers dominated the second phase of privatizations, from 
 
 128. Bruno Balduccini & Amina Akram, Investment Protection in the Brazilian Banking 
Sector, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 193, 200 (Daniel de Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau 
de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci eds., 2013). 
 129. Wei, supra note 73, at 673.  
 130. Lei No. 4.131 de 3 de Setembro de 1962 (“Lei de capitais Estrangeiros”). 
 131. Balduccini & Akram, supra note 128, at 205.  
 132. Id. at 209.  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. PowerPoint Presentation, Ministry of Dev., Indus. & Foreign Trade, Privatization in 
Brazil 6, 15, 29, 31 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/ 
sites/default/bndes_en/Galerias/Download/studies/priv_brazil.pdf. 
 136. Id. 
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1995 to 2002.
137
 This was also the time period when public services 
were transferred to the private sector in the hopes of improving the 
quality of services provided to the Brazilian society.
138
 The Brazilian 
government also initiated public offerings for Petrobras in the 
petroleum industry and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce in the mining 
industry.
139
 
The Brazilian government supplemented the Privatization 
Program with a policy of public service concessions and public 
private partnerships (PPPs), which are regulated by the Concessions 
Act and the Brazilian Public Private Partnerships Act, described 
infra.
140
 These projects transfer the responsibility for development, 
financing, construction, and operation of public services to the 
private sector, while allowing the private actor to collect fees from 
users upon completion.
141
 Due to the dire need for infrastructure 
within the country and the various guarantees provided by the 
government in these PPP and concession contracts, these 
development structures have become very attractive for foreign 
investors.
142
 
Another form of investment incentive came in the form of double 
taxation treaties
143
 (DTTs), which were ratified over the same period 
in which BITs were being considered by Congress.
144
 In fact, twenty-
four DTTs were approved without conditions.
145
 Lemos & Campello 
report that industry representatives and multinational corporations 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Eliana Baraldi & Jorge Vargas Neto, Investment Arbitration and Public-Private 
Partnership Agreements in Brazil, in INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN BRAZIL 159, 164 (Daniel de 
Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau de Borja & Adriana Noemi Pucci, eds. 2013). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 163, 166–67. 
 143. Tax treaties are usually bilateral agreements that “play a key role in the context of 
international cooperation in tax matters. On the one hand, they encourage international 
investment and, consequently, global economic growth, by reducing or eliminating international 
double taxation over cross-border income. On the other hand, they enhance cooperation among 
tax administrations, especially in tackling international tax evasion.” U.N., HANDBOOK ON 
SELECTED ISSUES IN ADMIN. OF DOUBLE TAX TREATIES FOR DEV. COUNTRIES (Alexander 
Trepelkov, Harry Tonino & Dominika Halka eds.), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ 
documents/UN_Handbook_DTT_Admin.pdf.  
 144. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 29. 
 145. Id. at 25.  
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saw DTTs as their real priority, as compared to BITs, giving those 
treaties a distinct constituency that could motivate ratification.
146
 This 
can perhaps be attributed to the immediate financial impact DTTs 
have on investors, as opposed to BITs, which serve mainly as a 
platform for dispute resolution and substantive standards in the event 
that a promised investment protection is breached. 
C. Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration in Brazil 
In its infancy, the very institution of arbitration itself faced 
challenges in Brazil. Though Congress ratified the Panama 
Convention in 1995,
147
 passed its Arbitration Law in 1996,
148
 and 
ratified the Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign 
Judgments and Arbitral Awards (“Montevideo Convention”) in 
1997,
149
 arbitration was not fully accepted until the Brazilian 
Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality on December 12, 2001.
150
 
Prior to this ruling, the Cláusula Compromissória did not allow for 
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes, whereas 
the new Arbitration Law more closely tracked UNCITRAL 
guidelines for deference to arbitration clauses that anticipate future 
disputes, as well as pending submissions to arbitration.
151
 After the 
constitutionality of this legislation was settled, Brazil quickly became 
a signatory to the New York Convention in 2002.
152
 Actions for 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards were first heard by 
the Supremo Tribunal Federal and were then dedicated to the 
Superior Tribunal de Justiça. These cases have received generally 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Jonathan C. Hamilton, Three Decades of Latin American Commercial Arbitration, 30 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1099, 1114 (2009).  
 148. Lei No. 9.307, de 23 Setembro de 1996, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
24.9.1996 (Braz.).  
 149. Lemos & Campello, supra note 25, at 13.  
 150. Julio C. Barbosa, Arbitration Law in Brazil: An Inevitable Reality, 9 SW. J.L. & 
TRADE AM. 131, 131–32 (2002).  
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 138; see also JAN PAULSSON, NIGEL RAWDING & LUCY REED, THE 
FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 42 (3d ed. 
2011).  
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positive treatment; the rare refusals to enforce were on procedural 
grounds.
153
 
In the wake of this turning of the tides in the area of commercial 
arbitration, the Brazilian Congress has managed to authorize state 
participation in two forms of dispute resolution. First, in 2004, 
Congress approved arbitration of PPP contracts, in accordance with 
the Brazilian Arbitration Act.
154
 In the following year, Congress 
amended the Brazilian Concessions Law
155
 to allow for the 
arbitration of disputes arising out of concessions contracts.
156
 
However, both of these laws are subject to two restrictions: (1) the 
language of the arbitration must be Portuguese, and (2) the arbitration 
must be seated in Brazil.
157
 
Along with these procedural conditions, there are other 
requirements for arbitration against Brazil or state entities—
subjective arbitrability, objective arbitrability, and consent.
158
 
Subjective arbitrability refers to the capacity of a party to submit its 
dispute to arbitration.
159
 In this case, the question would be whether 
municipal law grants the Brazilian Public Administration capacity to 
participate in arbitration.
160
 Even though state entities are not granted 
legal personhood under Brazilian law, they do have contractual 
capacity.
161
 Thus, provisions in the Concessions Law and the Public-
Private Partnerships Law are not specific authorizations but instead 
reinforcements of the Brazilian Arbitration Act, which allows the 
state to submit to arbitration—and to comply with an arbitral 
award.
162
 
 
 153. Hamilton, supra note 147, at 1115 (detailing the cases where the Brazilian courts 
denied recognition or enforcement. Two cases were denied because the Brazilian party was 
improperly summoned, three cases where there was no valid written arbitration agreement, and 
one case where the arbitral award had been assigned to a third party that lacked standing to seek 
recognition and enforcement.). 
 154. PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 42.  
 155. Lei No. 8.987, de 13 de Fevereiro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO, [D.O.U.] de 
14.02.1995 (Braz.).  
 156. PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 42. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 39. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 41. 
 162. Id. 
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Objective arbitrability concerns whether the dispute is capable of 
being decided by arbitration.
163
 Under the Brazilian Arbitration Act, 
this means “disputes related to freely transferrable patrimonial 
rights,” or rights exercised by their holder “that are not contrary to 
mandatory rules of the Brazilian legal system.”164 In practice, this 
refers to disputes that could be solved by the parties themselves, 
without a mandatory intervention by the Brazilian courts—e.g., 
preservation of the economic-financial balance of the contract. The 
parties themselves may not resolve clauses imposed by the state to 
protect the public interest; these are considered inalienable.
165
 
Regarding consent, the absence of BITs significantly narrows the 
situations in which Brazil concedes to the jurisdiction of an arbitral 
tribunal. While BITs establish general consent upon which the 
investor may rely, or “arbitration without privity,” the Concessions 
Law and the Public Private Partnerships Law merely allow the state 
to be a party to arbitration.
166
 Actual consent requires an individual 
contract in order to be upheld as valid under the Brazilian Arbitration 
Act.
167
 Thus, there can be no “arbitration without privity.”168 
With these restrictions, Brazil has created a largely local or 
national-level system of investment arbitration that differs from the 
ICSID model in terms of language, location, the requirements for 
consent, and subject matter jurisdiction. These variances are likely to 
increase the need to interact with the national court system. Although 
the highest Brazilian court clarified the position of arbitration in 
Brazil in 2001, Brazil’s civil law judiciary and the absence of binding 
precedent can lead to extensive litigation in the Brazilian court 
system before or concurrent with arbitral proceedings.
169
 However, it 
has also been urged that even without BITs and a system of ICSID-
style quasi-precedential arbitral decisions, Brazil provides the same 
level of investment protection.
170
 PPP agreements and concessions 
 
 163. Id. at 42. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 43. 
 166. PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 42. 
 167. Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 57. 
 168. Id. 
 169. PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 42. 
 170. Whitsitt & Vis-Dunbar, supra note 6. 
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contracts are negotiable with regards to arbitration clauses, and the 
Brazilian Constitution—along with individual pieces of legislation—
restricts expropriation without compensation, provides fair and 
equitable treatment, establishes strict liability by the state for its acts, 
and ensures free entry and exit of investments.
171
 In addition, it has 
been reported the Brazilian judiciary has consistently upheld arbitral 
clauses that designate the Brazilian government and its state-owned 
entities as parties.
172
  
V. USING THEORY AND RESEARCH TO REFRAME BRAZIL’S 
“FAILURE” TO RATIFY ITS BITS 
A. Hirschman’s Theory of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
Albert Hirschman first wrote about the theory of exit, voice, and 
loyalty in 1970.
173
 He focused primarily on markets and consumer 
goods, but the theory so succinctly and elegantly outlined the 
balancing factors for any organization that others soon applied it to 
states and international organizations.
174
 Recognizing, as Hirschman 
does, that all organizations are inherently unstable, the theory of exit, 
voice, and loyalty serves as a method for understanding the pulls and 
pushes in and out of organizations. First, we explain the theory in 
more detail and then, we apply it to Brazil’s refusal to ratify BITs. 
Exit, which comes from the world of economics to analyze market 
factors, is generally defined as the ability of one party to leave or 
sever the relationship with the other party.
175
 Under perfect market 
conditions—i.e., when there are multiple vendors offering a 
particular product—consumers can easily exit. Such exit will then 
communicate to a company it is not doing something right and must 
 
 171. Pedro Henrique Jardim, Note, Are Investment Protection Mechanisms Provided by 
Brazilian Law as Effective as Stabilisation Clauses for Petroleum Investments?, 15 CTR. 
ENERGY, PETROLEUM & MIN. L. & POL’Y ANN. REV. 9 (2013). 
 172. PAULSSON ET AL., supra note 152, at 42. 
 173. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). 
 174. For example, Joseph Weiler used exit, voice, and loyalty to analyze the historic 
development of the EU up to the early 1990’s. Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of 
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2411 (1991). For another use of this rubric in domestic politics, 
see Heather Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013). 
 175. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 173, at 21. 
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change in order to stay competitive. As Hirschman notes, however, 
such choice of exit is not always feasible.
176
 Consumers cannot exit 
from a monopoly; workers may not exit easily from a workplace; 
similarly, citizens may not exit easily from a country. 
Voice comes from the world of politics and is a concept used in 
political science to assess participation.
177
 It is “messy” compared to 
exit. Voice is the concept that one party will make an attempt to 
change the practices with which it is unhappy, rather than leave the 
relationship.
178
 As Hirschman puts it, “[V]oice is here defined as any 
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable 
state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to 
the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher 
authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or 
through various types of actions and protests, including those that are 
meant to mobilize public opinion.”179  
In business relations, voice occurs when consumers directly 
complain to management about a product, rather than choose to go 
elsewhere (i.e., complaining to Coca Cola about New Coke, rather 
than buying Pepsi, or complaining to Dell about its computers, rather 
than switching to Apple). In a democracy, citizens use voice 
frequently. Citizens are much less likely to consider exit (moving 
from the country) an option (although the continued occurrence and 
controversy associated with immigration indicates that a substantial 
minority of people are willing to exit their countries, depending on 
their living circumstances). In a democracy, citizens voice their 
disapproval through voting, protesting, expressing public opinions, 
mobilizing to offer or support candidates for office, and bringing 
lawsuits.
180
 
 
 176. Id. at 56. As the EU evolved, Weiler notes that one of the key developments was 
closing off exit and requiring countries to follow the EU laws more closely. Weiler, supra note 
174, at 2412–23. Weiler wrote his article in 1991, however, and one could argue that certain 
countries have since used selective exit with the EU.  
 177. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 173, at 30. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 32. As applied to the EU, voice is shown during the early years of the EU, when 
member states took control over the EU Commission in order to enact the policies that the 
member states desired. 
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So how do the concepts of voice and exit relate to each other? 
Hirschman argues most organizations are dominated by one or the 
other mechanism.
181
 If someone tries to exit when exit is essentially 
closed, as in families, clans, and some religious communities, there 
will be significant penalties.
182
 Voice then becomes the only option. 
We might analogize certain international structures (e.g., the UN or 
NATO) to a no-exit or monopoly situation, in which exiting is very 
difficult, costly, and thus rarely used.  
Meanwhile, Hirschman argues that “[t]he presence of the exit 
option can sharply reduce the probability that the voice option will be 
taken up widely and effectively.”183 Yet, “the decision to exit will 
often be taken in light of the prospects for effective use of voice.”184 
According to Hirschman, since voice takes effort, it will only be used 
in situations where influence is likely to work.
185
 Voice is more likely 
to work for someone who is a member of an organization (e.g., serves 
on the board of a company that produces consumer products) than for 
an individual consumer who buys the company’s products. 
Ironically—and here is the problem with the interplay of voice and 
exit—those members who care most about the quality of a product 
are also the first ones to exit, even though their voice might be the 
most persuasive.
186
 In these cases, when exit is used by the most 
influential and persuasive members, the organization itself faces 
decline. Hirschman uses public schools as an example, and it is 
useful to consider what happens when the most motivated and 
educated parents pull their children from public school, rather than 
try to improve the school.
187
 
Therefore, Hirschman argues, we can benefit from a monopoly in 
which parties cannot exit.
188
 A monopoly is best utilized when exit 
would drain the best and brightest—the most “quality-conscious, 
 
 181. Id. at 120. 
 182. Id. at 96. 
 183. Id. at 76. 
 184. Id. at 37. 
 185. Id. at 39. 
 186. Id. at 47. 
 187. Id. at 51–54. 
 188. Id. at 55. 
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alert, and potentially activist”189—and voice has the potential to be 
effective once the members are locked in. This assertion by 
Hirschman assumes, of course, that even locked-in members still 
have the capacity to use voice, and such voice has the potential to 
produce change. 
According to Hirschman, loyalty moderates between the voice and 
exit options.
190
 Loyalty makes exit less likely and voice more 
effective.
191
 When an individual is loyal to an organization, he or she 
is more likely to search for ways to be heard, or to gain influence or 
power in the organization to which he or she is loyal.
192
 For example, 
parents attend school board meetings, help in the classroom, or join 
the PTA. Such loyalty makes it more likely their voices will be 
heard—i.e., that the improvements they suggest will happen. As for 
exit, loyalty may postpone exit, but loyalty’s “very existence is 
predicated on the possibility of exit.”193 Hirschman observes: “That 
even the most loyal member can exit is often an important part of his 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the organization.”194 Indeed, the threat of 
exit can actually make the person’s voice more effective.195 This 
assumes, however, that the threat is implicit rather than explicit. 
Explicit threats to leave, in fact, can communicate disloyalty.
196
 
In order to optimize organizations, a mix of both voice and exit is 
necessary. Even when organizations primarily rely on one 
mechanism, a jolt of the other is often necessary to improve the 
organization. Of course, as Hirschman notes, this requirement of both 
is inherently unstable.
197
 
This pull and push, the balancing of goals, and the concerns raised 
in the theory of exit, voice, and loyalty are all present in the context 
of international investment. If a foreign company is unhappy with the 
way its investment-related dispute is being treated in the host state’s 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 76. 
 191. Id. at 77. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 82. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 120. 
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courts, and the state refuses to change its procedures or permit exit to 
private arbitration, the company may choose to withdraw its 
investment and thus exit entirely from the state. Alternatively, if a 
foreign company is contemplating an investment but fears how it will 
be treated in the host state’s courts, the company may choose to 
forego investment. This logic appears to underlie arguments 
regarding the need for BITs. In other words, investment arbitration 
proponents argued throughout the 1990s that companies would refuse 
to invest in Brazil unless the state signed and ratified BITs.
198
  
The example of exit in Brazil, however, presents a mirror image. 
Brazil chose to exit from the BITs it had negotiated, rather than 
investors choosing to exit the Brazilian market. Brazil, as described 
supra, is one of the largest markets to choose to exit the international 
investment arbitration system. Was this, as Hirschman might 
hypothesize, because of unhappiness with the product? Was this 
because changing the product was more difficult than exiting? Or was 
this because voice could be acknowledged and met through the 
creation of different and more mutually-acceptable products? 
All three of these factors explain why Brazil did not ratify the 
treaties. First, as outlined supra, different elements of Brazil’s 
legislature were unhappy with the BITs and unpersuaded that these 
treaties provided significant advantages. In the early 2000s, 
Argentina offered a vivid demonstration of the troubles that could 
result from arbitration pursuant to BITs. Second, the negotiation 
structure itself made “voice” very difficult to exercise vis-à-vis each 
treaty. Any amendment potentially meant reopening negotiations 
with a foreign government and starting over. Most significantly, 
legislators used their opportunities for voice as various committees 
considered the treaties—and the legislators used voice again in the 
creation and ratification of other treaties and legislation that protected 
investors’ most salient and immediate interests, while also 
 
 198. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: 
PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/ 
11, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11 (2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia 
200911_en.pdf (“Host states wishing to attract and promote foreign investment often seek to 
offer predictability to foreign investors by favouring international arbitration as the means for 
investors to deal with a dispute.”).  
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responding to Brazil’s social, economic, and political concerns. 
Investors received what mattered most to them: free movement of 
capital and the elimination of double taxation (also acknowledged as 
primary considerations by MIGA).
199
  
The story of Brazil’s refusal to ratify its BITs also may reveal 
some voices—i.e., the voices of the negotiating agents—as less 
important than those voices of the key players. The diplomats who 
negotiated the BITs certainly favored ratification of the product they 
presented to the Brazilian executive and Congress. But the BITs were 
simply means to accomplish the objectives of the executive and its 
core departments—i.e., the Finance Ministry, Central Bank, and Casa 
Civil. The voices of these departments were more important than 
those of the Itamaraty, and they were willing to accept alternative 
means to achieve their primary objectives.  
Finally, the concept of loyalty might help to explain why the 
Congress was willing to ratify or pass other legislation and might be 
willing to consider further legislation or treaties. Brazilian 
multinationals may well advocate for BITs in the future to protect 
their own foreign investments. The Brazilian government might be 
willing to listen to the voices of these loyal companies as they explain 
the advantages of BITs and the investment arbitration system. 
B. Brief Consideration of Procedural Justice Research and Theories 
As with Hirschman’s theory, procedural justice theory and 
empirical research in this area affirm the importance of voice. Indeed, 
the opportunity for voice is an extremely important element that 
persuades people that a decision-making or dispute resolution process 
is procedurally fair.
200
 This perception is important, because if people 
perceive a decision-making or dispute resolution procedure as fair, 
 
 199. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
 200. See E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 218 (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988); E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and 
Reactions to Legal Authorities, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 180 (Austin 
Sarat et al. eds., 1998); see also Nancy A. Welsh, Donna Stienstra & Bobbi McAdoo, The 
Application of Procedural Justice Research to Judicial Actions and Techniques in Settlement 
Sessions, in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 65–
69 (Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2013). 
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they are more likely to perceive the resulting outcome of that 
procedure as fair, even if the outcome is not what they preferred.
201
 
People also are more likely to comply with the outcome
202
 and 
perceive the institution providing the procedure as legitimate.
203
 As 
discussed briefly, infra, the willingness to judge a disadvantageous 
outcome as fair and the institution as legitimate suggests the potential 
for a relationship between perceptions of procedural justice and the 
emergence of loyalty as described by Hirschman.
204
 
There is a vast socio-psychological literature revealing more about 
voice and the other procedural elements most likely to lead people to 
 
 201. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 200, at 66–70, 205; Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: 
Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 119 (2000). 
 202. See Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, supra note 201, at 119; Lind, 
supra note 200, at 177, 192; Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: 
Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850, 
857 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of 
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 664, 660–70, 673–
74 (2006–2007) (describing procedural justice findings generally and research that has 
identified “procedural justice and trust as the key antecedents of the willingness to defer to legal 
authorities”). 
 203. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 200, at 209; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE 
LAW 94–108 (1990); Lind, supra note 200, at 188; Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal 
Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 
885–86 (1997) (suggesting that the influence of procedural justice judgments supports the idea 
that “the public has a very moral orientation toward the courts” and “[t]hey expect the courts to 
conform to their moral standards,” especially regarding “the fairness of the procedures by 
which the courts make decisions”); David B. Rottman, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
TRUST & CONFIDENCE IN THE CAL. COURTS 24 (2005), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
documents/4_37pubtrust1.pdf; Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law, supra 
note 202, at 665. See generally Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful 
Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 71, 95–105 (2013); Welsh, Stienstra & McAdoo, supra note 200, at 65–69; Nancy A. 
Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 165 (Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back through the 
Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants about the Place, Value and Meaning 
of Mediation, 19 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 573 (2004); Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants’ Decision 
Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise[,] Without Procedural Justice, 2002 
J. DISP. RESOL. 179 (2002); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: 
What’s Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817–30 (2001). 
 204. See infra Part V.3. 
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perceive decision-making processes and dispute resolution processes 
as procedurally fair:  
 Voice. First and most important, people must perceive that 
they had the opportunity to express what was important to 
them, or had voice.
205
 The more that people perceive they 
had the opportunity to express what was important to them, 
the more they perceive the process as fair. Voice is not 
necessarily the same thing as participation or direct 
engagement in the give-and-take of negotiation. Indeed, 
people’s perceptions of their level of participation or direct 
engagement in negotiation have less effect than simple 
voice on their procedural justice perceptions.
206
  
 Respectful treatment from the decision maker. Second, 
people must perceive that they were treated in a respectful 
and dignified manner.
207
  
 
 205. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 200, at 211–12; Lind, supra note 200, at 180; Tyler, 
Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, supra note 201, at 121 (describing voice as the 
opportunity for people to present their “suggestions” or “arguments about what should be done 
to resolve a problem or conflict” or “sharing the discussion over the issues involved in their 
problem or conflict” and also noting that voice effects have been found even when people know 
they will have little or no influence on decision makers); Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, 
and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 
171, (2005); Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to 
Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 488 (2010) (reporting that 
voice “shapes evaluations about neutrality, trust, and respect” and has the “strongest influence, 
followed respectively by neutrality, trust, and respect”). It should be noted, however, that 
people are also aware of their vulnerability to manipulation, and if they perceive evidence of 
unfair treatment or perceive “false representations of fair treatment,” they respond with 
“extremely negative reactions.” See Lind, supra note 200, at 187; see also Tom R. Tyler, 
Kenneth A. Rasinski & Nancy Spodick, Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: 
Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 73–74 
(1985) (explaining that under certain conditions, voice without decision control heightens 
feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction with leaders, a result described as the 
“frustration effect.”). 
 206. See Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical 
Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 447–52 (2010) (distinguishing between clients’ direct 
participation and indirect participation as their lawyers negotiated on their behalf); see also 
Roselle L. Wissler, Party Participation and Voice in Mediation, 18 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 20 
(2011). 
 207. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value 
Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830 at 831 (1989); E. Allen Lind et al., In the Eye 
of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 958 (1990); Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, supra 
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 Even-handed treatment, neutrality of forum. Third, 
people must perceive that they were treated in an even-
handed manner, and that the forum was neutral—or at least 
not predisposed against them. This element can be 
understood in both structural and interactional (or even 
relational) terms. In terms of structure, people need to 
perceive that the role of the decision maker or dispute 
resolution forum is to make decisions or resolve disputes by 
applying fair and objective standards. In terms of 
interaction, people also need to perceive that the particular 
decision maker actually tried to be open-minded and treat 
their arguments in the same manner as others’ arguments 
were treated, even if specific outcomes differed.
208
 Tom 
Tyler has asserted that people watch for “cues that 
communicate information about the intentions and 
character”209 of the decision maker—cues, for example, that 
the decision maker has tried to apply objective standards 
carefully, fairly, and in a well-meaning manner, based on 
relevant and objective factors.
210
   
 
note 201, at 122; Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, infra note 221, at 419–20. While 
respectful treatment is described here as an essential element of procedural justice, it has also 
been described as an element of interactional justice, and even of distributive justice. See 
Robert J. Bies, Are Procedural Justice and Interactional Justice Conceptually Distinct?, in 
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 85 (Jerald Greenberg & Jason A. Colquitt eds., 
2005).  
 208. See Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law?, supra note 202, at 664 
(“Transparency and openness foster the belief that decision-making procedures are neutral.”); 
see also Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: 
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747 
(2003) (distinguishing between “formal” or “structural” aspects of groups that influence 
perceptions of process fairness, such as group rules, and the “informal” influences that result 
from an individual authority’s actual implementation of the rules). 
 209. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law?, supra note 202, at 664. 
 210. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, supra note 201, at 122; see also Tyler, 
Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra note 202, at 853–54; Tom R. Tyler, 
Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Test of 
Four Models, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 337 (1987). 
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 Trustworthy consideration from the decision maker. 
There is substantial overlap between the former element 
and this fourth element. People seek cognitive reassurance 
that the decision maker has heard and accurately 
understood
211
 what they said. People also seek relational 
reassurance that the decision maker sincerely considered 
what they said and that they can trust the decision maker.
212
  
Both cognitive and relational theories explain the influence of 
procedural justice. Cognitively, people want to be reassured that 
decision makers will be fully informed before coming to their 
decisions.
213
 Provision of the opportunity for voice, the demonstration 
of understanding, and even-handed treatment in a neutral forum 
respond to this desire. Research indicates, however, that people are 
influenced by procedural fairness even when they have been told that 
their voice will not influence the outcome.
214
 Thus, procedural justice 
researchers now theorize that procedural fairness serves as a fairness 
“heuristic.”215 Though heuristics generally are useful and well 
 
 211. See Lind, supra note 200, at 179. 
 212. See D.E. Conlon et al., Nonlinear and Nonmonotonic Effects of Outcome on 
Procedural and Distributive Fairness Judgments, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1083, 1095 
(1989). Note that trust is itself a nuanced concept. For example, efficient commercial relations 
rely on “calculus-based” trust, the reliable delivery of promised or desirable behaviors, based on 
an instrumental cost-benefit analysis. Alternatively, trust may be “identification-based,” with 
such complete identification, understanding, and appreciation that one person can act for the 
other. See ROY J. LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATION 288 (5th ed. 2005); see also Hollander-
Blumoff & Tyler, infra note 219, at 494; Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of 
Law?, supra note 202, at 671 (noting that research demonstrates that people’s inferences about 
legal authorities’ trustworthiness are central to their reactions). 
 213. This is called “instrumental” or “social exchange” theory. See Lind, supra note 200, at 
179. 
 214. Id. at 180–81. 
 215. See E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using 
Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 225 (1993) (reporting 
researchers found that procedural justice judgments strongly influenced litigants’ decisions 
about whether or not to accept nonbinding arbitration awards, regardless of whether litigants 
were individuals, small business owners, or corporate officers; only corporate employees 
demonstrated no link between their procedural justice judgments and their decisions to accept 
awards); see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the 
Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 137 (2011) (citing Kees van den Bos et al., How Do I 
Judge My Outcome When I Do Not Know the Outcome of Others? The Psychology of the Fair 
Process Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1034, 1034 (1997)); MacCoun, supra 
note 205, at 171, 185–86 (describing fairness heuristic theory). 
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grounded, their effectiveness also can reveal the workings of 
cognitive bias.
216
   
From a relational perspective, people want to know they are 
valued members of the social group and will be treated fairly.
217
 
Therefore, people also use their perceptions of procedure to assess 
whether they can trust decision makers and their procedures.
218
 Being 
able to trust in this manner can help them to manage the vulnerability 
associated with uncertainty.
219
   
Applying procedural justice theory and research to Brazil’s choice 
not to ratify the BITs, it becomes quite clear that Brazilian legislators 
had substantial voice during the four years spent in the ratification 
process. As noted supra, however, the nature of the treaty ratification 
process limited the effect their voices could have on the treaty itself. 
Indeed, the proposed modifications to the treaty likely would have 
required renegotiation. Importantly, however, the executive’s 
 
 216. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, 64 ALA. L. REV. 389 (2012) (generally 
examining the different views of heuristics, with some commentators focusing on the errors 
caused by heuristics and other commentators describing them as reflecting “ecological 
rationality”). See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). There 
is a growing recognition of the extent and effects of implicit bias and unconscious bias. See, 
e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias 
across the Legal System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563 (2013). 
 217. See Donald E. Conlon et al., supra note 212; see also Tyler, Psychological Models of 
the Justice Motive, supra note 202, at 858. 
 218. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Reputational Advantages of Demonstrating 
Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students, 28 NEGOTIATION. J. 1, 117 
(2012); Robert K. Vischer, Big Law and the Marginalization of Trust, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
165 (2012). 
 219. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: 
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
473, 477 (2008) (citing E. Allan Lind, Fairness Judgments as Cognitions, in THE JUSTICE 
MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002)); Kees van den Bos & 
E. Allan Lind, Uncertainty Management by Means of Fairness Judgments, 34 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 26–30 (2002); see also Nancy A. Welsh & Barbara Gray, 
Searching for a Sense of Control: The Challenge Presented by Community Conflicts over 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 295 (2002). Even 
though the focus of the “group value” theories is relational rather than cognitive, there is other 
research indicating people are indeed likely to judge in-group members more favorably and 
treat them better than out-group members. Therefore, relational concerns should not be 
understood as the opposite of cognitive concerns. Ronald J. Fisher, Intergroup Conflict, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 166–67 (Deutsch & Coleman eds., 2000).  
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response in this instance was neither heavy-handed nor manipulative, 
and instead created the opportunity for the emergence of alternative 
measures. The substance of these measures suggests that the 
executive and legislators listened to, and understood, each other and 
the most important concerns expressed by both the opponents and 
proponents of the BITs.   
C. The Relationship between Procedural Justice and Loyalty 
Although Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice, and loyalty describes 
the effects of loyalty, it does not do much to explain how loyalty 
emerges. Nor does Hirschman’s theory acknowledge the independent 
value of listening, sincere and trustworthy consideration, expressing 
understanding, and demonstrating respect. Hirschman’s focus instead 
is on concrete change in response to voice.  
Procedural justice research and theories regarding the importance 
of listening and trustworthy consideration may help to explain the 
emergence of loyalty. More specifically, when a state, workplace, or 
other organization offers trustworthy consideration, as well as even-
handed and dignified treatment, the organization is responding to 
voice in a manner that is likely to enhance compliance and 
perceptions of legitimacy.
220
 These, logically, should also enhance 
loyalty. They may even encourage further voice.  Such voice and 
consideration have been found to be correlated with increased trust, 
enhanced information sharing, and a greater likelihood of developing 
responsive integrative solutions,
221
 just as occurred in Brazil. Based 
on procedural justice theory, however, enhanced compliance, 
perceptions of legitimacy, and loyalty are more likely to occur even if 
the organization does not provide the outcome that those expressing 
themselves wanted. 
 
 220. See, e.g., Andrea K. Schneider & Natalie Fleury, There’s No Place Like Home: 
Applying Dispute Systems Design Theory to Create a Foreclosure Mediation System, 11 NEV. 
L.J. 368 (2011) (discussing the perceptions of participants in a foreclosure mediation process). 
 221. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 416 
(2010); Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 219, at 473 (also observing that such behaviors 
do not reduce negotiators’ effectiveness in arriving at beneficial distributive outcomes); Welsh, 
The Reputational Advantages of Trustworthiness, supra note 217 (proposing a mutually-
supportive relationship among a cooperative negotiation style, procedurally just behaviors, 
perceptions of trustworthiness, and a reputation as an effective negotiator). 
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Of course, there are and should be limits to the occurrence of 
these effects. Persistent failure to respond to voice with concrete 
change, especially when such response is forthcoming for others who 
are no more (or even less) deserving, will undermine loyalty.
222
 But 
the effects of procedural justice may help to explain why there need 
not always be concrete change in response to voice, provided there is 
trustworthy, sincere, respectful, and even-handed consideration of 
what has been said. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When viewed from the perspective of theory and research, 
Brazil’s decision to enact alternative legislation and constitutional 
provisions, rather than ratify BITs, represents a successful means to 
acknowledge disparate voices, avoid foreign investors’ exit, and even 
enhance loyalty. It is only from the perspective of the negotiators of 
the BITs and the proponents of international arbitration that this 
decision might represent a failure. 
Importantly, however, Brazil’s choice does not represent an 
unqualified success. While the system of national-level constitutional 
and legislative protections, contractual consent to arbitration with the 
state, and economic investment incentives has served Brazil well over 
the past decade, there are certain aspects of this dynamic that can be 
detrimental to those foreign investors who encounter difficulties. 
Most strikingly, there are certain aspects of arbitration with the 
Brazilian Public Administration under the Brazilian Arbitration Act 
that do not match the neutral dispute resolution provided by a 
detached international forum. Automatic application of Brazilian law 
as the applicable substantive standard in arbitration with the state can 
put foreign investors at a disadvantage, due to the many protections 
 
 222. People are aware of their vulnerability to manipulation, and if they perceive evidence 
of unfair treatment or perceive “false representations of fair treatment,” they respond with 
“extremely negative reactions.” See Lind, supra note 200, at 187; see also Tyler, Rasinski & 
Spodick, supra note 205 (explaining that under certain conditions, voice without decision 
control heightens feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction with leaders, a result 
described as the “frustration effect”); Robert J. MacCoun, supra note 205, at 171, 188–93 
(describing the potential for the manipulative use of procedural justice and “false 
consciousness”). 
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the Brazilian government can give itself in the legislative process.
223
 
In addition, the designation of Brazil as the seat, Portuguese as the 
language, and Brazilian law as the applicable law severely limits the 
available neutrals who can sit as arbitrators in disputes against the 
state, especially outside of Brazil.
224
 
Additionally, as Brazil has become a capital exporter, rather than 
merely an importer like many of its peers in Latin America, the 
Brazilian government now finds it has its own international investors 
to protect.
225
 Without BITs, Brazilian companies investing abroad are 
subject to the local laws of the host country, as is true for foreign 
entities in Brazil.
226
 Although Brazilian companies have engaged in 
very creative workarounds by incorporating in other states with 
favorable BITs,
227
 it is probably not in Brazil’s interests to force its 
corporations to fend for themselves in this manner. Thus, there will 
be a need, once again, for an opportunity for voice and responsive 
listening, and the definition of success will continue to evolve. 
 
 223. Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 49, 56–59. See BG Group PLC v. Republic of 
Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014), and Corparacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v. 
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 224. Barbosa & Martini, supra note 77, at 52.  
 225. See Neto, supra note 39, at 3–4. 
 226. Id. at 10–11. 
 227. See also Fernandes de Andrade & Justino de Oliveira, supra note 8, at 90 (urging 
there is not a need for Brazil to enter into BITs, pointing out the disadvantages of arbitration 
pursuant to BITs versus individually-negotiated contracts, and explaining the advantages of 
Brazil’s evolving administrative structure—including more decentralized agencies, the 
development of quasi-independent agencies, incorporation of arbitration, and collaboration with 
nation-specific chambers of commerce (e.g., Brazil-Canada)). 
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